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ABSTRACT 
As mobile computing applications have become commonplace, it 
is increasingly important for them to address end-users’ privacy 
requirements. Privacy requirements depend on a number of 
contextual socio-cultural factors to which mobility adds another 
level of contextual variation. However, traditional requirements 
elicitation methods do not sufficiently account for contextual 
factors and therefore cannot be used effectively to represent and 
analyse the privacy requirements of mobile end users. On the 
other hand, methods that do investigate contextual factors tend to 
produce data that does not lend itself to the process of 
requirements extraction. To address this problem we have 
developed a Privacy Requirements Distillation approach that 
employs a problem analysis framework to extract and refine 
privacy requirements for mobile applications from raw data 
gathered through empirical studies involving end users. Our 
approach introduces privacy facets that capture patterns of privacy 
concerns which are matched against the raw data. We demonstrate 
and evaluate our approach using qualitative data from an 
empirical study of a mobile social networking application.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.2.1 [Requirements/Specifications]: Methodologies; H1.2 
[User/Machine Systems]: Human factors. 
General Terms - Design, Security, Human Factors. 
Keywords - privacy; mobile; requirements engineering 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The age of ubiquitous computing, particularly the rapid increase 
in the use of smart phones, has created a mass market for software 
applications that are being used in every context of users’ daily 
lives. Previous research [1] has highlighted how system designers, 
policy makers, and organisations can easily become isolated from 
end-users’ perceptions of privacy in different contexts. For mobile 
applications, end-users’ context changes frequently and 
unpredictably, and observations of such users [33] suggest that 
changes in context result in changes in users’ privacy 
requirements. Omitting these privacy requirements can affect 
users’ privacy and consequently may have an impact on how well 
a system is adopted or utilised.  
While knowledge acquisition techniques such as the use of 
Personas [5] have proven successful at dealing with the challenges 
of gathering and analysing the requirements of a large user base, 
the highly dynamic, and hard to predict usage scenarios associated 
with mobile applications still pose a challenge for existing 
requirements engineering approaches. This is particularly true for 
privacy requirements, which are known to be highly context-
dependent [37] and are only likely to arise as users gain 
experience with an application [36]. This makes eliciting end-user 
privacy requirements for mobile applications both sensitive and 
difficult. Questionnaires do not elicit rich enough information 
about users’ decisions and how these are influenced by the 
emerging context in a particular situation. To overcome such 
limitations, Goguen and Linde [24] proposed the use of 
ethnographic analysis techniques, such as conversation, discourse 
and interaction analyses to obtain tacit knowledge of what users 
actually do in different work situations. They also showed how the 
discourse analysis of users’ stories can be used to explore the 
value systems of organisations and how the discourse analysis of 
users’ explanations can be used for situated task analysis [23]. 
While Rubenstein [40] and Beyer and Holzblatt [9] have shown 
that shadowing of users is useful for capturing contextual 
requirements to design and build new systems, when it comes to 
privacy this direct approach is problematic, since the experience 
of being under constant observation is likely to change the 
behaviour of the users in ways that invalidate any observed 
behaviours with respect to privacy. 
This prior work suggests that for mobile applications, privacy 
requirements are emergent requirements that need to be elicited 
and analysed from qualitative reports of the users’ experience of 
the application. While there have been ethnographic studies 
conducted by the HCI community to study end-user privacy [36], 
[3], [7], including our own user studies [33], [34], user experience 
data from such studies does not readily translate into 
requirements. Often, this qualitative data, in the form of interview 
transcripts or user written reports, may contain privacy 
requirements that are embedded and tightly entwined with user’s 
contextual experiences. The technical challenge in extracting 
these requirements systematically from the qualitative data relate 
to: (a) structuring and separating privacy relevant information 
from the qualitative data (b) identifying and extracting mobile 
privacy requirements from this data, and (c) modelling and 
representing the extracted mobile privacy requirements. Since 
privacy is a broad topic, we focus on personal privacy which 
refers to how people manage their privacy with respect to other 
individuals, as opposed to large organisations [26]. 
This paper makes two contributions, first, a novel framework is 
proposed for structuring problem analysis called privacy facets. 
The framework supports the identification of privacy requirements 
from different contextual perspectives – namely those of actors, 
information, information flows and places. It also uncovers 
privacy determinants and threats that a system must take into 
account in order to support the end-user’s privacy. The second 
contribution is a technique called requirements distillation - a 
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systematic method for qualitative data analysis that employs 
analysis models and patterns to extract and refine emergent 
software requirements, such as those relating to privacy for mobile 
applications. Distillation is a synthesis of thematic analysis from 
social sciences [10] and Problem Frames [27] from software 
engineering. Privacy requirements do not exist in a vacuum, rather 
they refer to other information requirements. Therefore, our 
approach to distilling privacy requirements makes the related 
information requirements manifest through the use of information 
problem patterns. Distillation makes use of both, information 
problem patterns and privacy facets to derive privacy 
requirements. 
For the purpose of evaluation, we choose a pragmatic approach 
[17], because it is more aligned to our objective of engineering 
‘practical solutions’ to real-world problems. Since distillation 
borrows techniques from both social sciences and software 
engineering, its evaluation is a mix of qualitative research 
methods [6][20] and case-study design [49]. Specifically, 
distillation is assessed for qualities such as: (a) employing a 
transparent and systematic process [49][22], (b) providing 
traceability by linking outputs to qualitative data [14][20], and (c) 
demonstrating applicability or usefulness of results [14] by 
informing system design. 
In §2 we discuss some of the related research relevant to privacy 
requirements for mobile applications. §3 describes the overall 
process of requirements distillation and §4 presents our privacy 
facets (PriF) framework, which we use to enable a structured 
analysis of the privacy problems experienced by users. In §5 we 
describe a case study of mobile Facebook application and in §6 
we discuss the results and limitations of the distillation process. 
§7 presents the available tool support. Finally, §8 concludes with 
ideas for future work. 
2. RELATED WORK 
Privacy management is a fine balancing act between what 
information is monitored, and the protections that are available 
against its search. As an enabler of both monitoring and 
searching, the architecture of mobile technology plays a key role 
in privacy [31]. In particular mobile application architectures 
incorporate numerous sensors (GPS, camera, accelerometer, etc.) 
that enable monitoring, together with ubiquitous network 
connectivity that enable continuous search and disclosure of 
monitored information. Further, the large screen displays of 
modern mobile devices facilitate proximal disclosures in public 
places. This leads us to view privacy as a constraint on the 
capabilities of the mobile application, and we adapt the concept of 
privacy described in Nissenbaum’s Contextual Integrity 
framework [37] to define Mobile Privacy Requirements as: a set 
of constraints on a mobile computing application that enables 
appropriate flow of information depending on the user’s context. 
Here the flow of information is the information sharing practices 
relevant to a user’s context [44] and norms [28] that regulate it 
contribute to its appropriateness from end users’ perspective. 
While there has been significant work to understand privacy 
requirements based on laws and regulations (e.g., health-care 
information regulations – HIPAA [11]; and OECD guidelines 
[50], organisation privacy policy [13]), this research does not 
specifically address privacy violations experienced by mobile 
users. One of the ways to capture behaviour requirements for a 
software system is through the use of Use Cases. Seyff et al. 
developed a software environment called ART-SCENE, later 
extended to mobile applications [41], to discover and document 
stakeholder requirements by walking through scenarios that are 
automatically generated from use case specifications.  
However, this approach is unlikely to work for studying mobile 
privacy because it is not practical to ask users to type their privacy 
requirements into a mobile device as they may be in transit or 
have limited input capabilities. Sutcliffe et al proposed a 
requirements elicitation framework (called PC-RE [45]) to 
describe functions that meet people’s goals; characteristics of the 
users; and how users would like computer systems to achieve their 
personal goals. However, this work does not focus on privacy 
goals of end users. 
The PriS method [29] uses eight categories of security and privacy 
principles to derive privacy requirements but these high-level 
principles are organisation-centric and do not cover fine-grained 
personal privacy threats end users face. In a similar approach, 
Deng et al. [15] have produced a threat taxonomy obtained by 
negating the main security properties. In their top-down 
LINDUUN approach, it may be difficult to a priori identify all 
potential privacy threats that are applicable to a software system. 
In Semantic Parameterization [12] privacy requirements were 
extracted from legal documents to produce a set of privacy 
requirements, however, these requirements are organisation-
centric and do not specifically focus on personal privacy. Some 
propose the modelling of users’ negative intent and behaviour as 
‘misuse cases’ [4], others have used these to elicit security 
requirements [42] and privacy requirements for mobile 
applications [38]. Although, these approaches can potentially 
highlight deficiencies in a software system, it is difficult to 
anticipate all possible misuses of a mobile software system. 
A number of researchers have investigated the uses of different 
types of qualitative data for requirements elicitation and design of 
mobile applications. For example, the user-centred Contextual 
Design method gathered a variety of data to develop a mobile 
application for baseball fans [25]. However, eliciting mobile 
privacy using this method will be problematic because shadowing 
of mobile end-users causes them to change their behaviour thus 
invalidating any requirements that were observed. In addition to 
this, privacy is a sensitive issue and often user’s are not be able 
articulate their choices and decisions in an emerging context. A 
number of other studies [30], [8], [47], have used an 
enthnomethodological approach to elicit privacy requirements for 
mobile applications. Although these studies provided rich datasets 
that contained mobile privacy requirements, they did not provide 
mechanisms to structure and represent them such that they could 
be understood and implemented by software engineers and 
designers. The privacy requirements distillation technique 
described in this paper addresses this problem. 
3. DISTILLATION PROCESS 
As already discussed, mobile privacy has been studied by 
ethnomethodologists with the specific aim of producing new 
theories and high-level design guidelines. However, not all of 
these theories and guidelines have translated into concrete system 
requirements or design artefacts. The primary aim of distillation is 
to not only equip and assist software engineers with analytical 
tools and techniques but also provide process guidance on the 
extraction of privacy requirements from qualitative data which can 
be used in the design of privacy-aware software systems.  
As a starting point, the distillation process relies on a software 
system that implements the initial requirements. This is the same 
software system for which qualitative data has been gathered and 
its user experiences are captured in the interview transcripts. The 
qualitative data and the initial systems requirements of the mobile 
application being studied form the two inputs to the distillation 
process (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Privacy requirements distillation process 
The distillation process consists of three main phases, namely: (1) 
Structuring of qualitative data; (2) Information-flow modelling; 
and (3) Privacy problem analysis. 
Using an inductive approach inspired by Thematic analysis from 
social sciences, in the first phase, the qualitative data is structured 
using the Privacy Facets (PriF) framework, which provides pre-
defined codes tailored for the identification of privacy-sensitive 
contexts. Once the privacy-sensitive contexts are isolated, 
additional codes from each facet of the PriF framework help in 
identifying the relevant privacy determinants and deriving the 
relevant privacy threats and concerns. The output of this phase is 
a set of privacy concerns experienced by users of the mobile 
application. 
In the second phase, using initial systems requirements, problem 
models of information-flows are developed based on the 
information-flow problem patterns provided in the PriF 
framework. These problem models not only capture how the 
information is created but also how it is disseminated to other 
users. 
The privacy problem analysis phase is the third phase where the 
privacy-sensitive context along with its privacy threats and 
concerns is analysed in conjunction with the information-flow 
problem models to identify the gaps in the current system, leading 
to the discovery of privacy requirements. 
The distillation approach is designed to be a sequential process 
where the structuring of qualitative data precedes information-
flow modelling and privacy problem analysis. In order to 
demonstrate our approach, we use data gathered from an empirical 
study of users of the mobile Facebook application1, conducted in 
2009 [33]. Although data from this study was analysed from an 
HCI perspective, it hadn’t been previously analysed specifically 
for the purpose of requirements extraction as done in this paper. 
In this study, users were electronically shadowed in an 
unobtrusive manner and their responses to privacy issues were 
captured through an in-depth post-hoc interview. While the data 
we have analysed covers a range of functionality supported by the 
application, due to space limitations, in this paper concentrate on 
the participants’ use of the ‘Update status message’ feature (Table 
1). 
Table 1. Example data from mobile Facebook study 
[A.1.16] If I am out with friends I don’t take my phone out, 
I don’t do Facebook ...yes, ok, if I am with my sister I keep 
to read emails, but no I don’t use Facebook and I tend not 
to use the mobile...because I am busy with other stuff, 
talking with them, socialising...Facebook tends to fill the 
gaps...if I am with a person I concentrate with that person. 
[A.2.25] ...things like buses and trains I don’t feel so 
comfortable..., because I don’t know...lots of people I don’t 
know...if they for example read some of the posts I have 
done...they don’t know the people that they are aimed at or 
the back story...they’d probably come across quite 
differently and they would not understand them, it would 
look a little weird..[they would get] the wrong sort of 
almost the wrong first impression. 
[A.3.42] anything I feel is private to myself I keep it to 
myself. I have a lot of good friends so if I want to share it I 
am happy to share it with all my friends. If there was 
something private, that is more close to me, like a girl that I 
liked and I wanted to share it with a friend I would do that 
in person rather than on Facebook 
 
In the subsequent sections, we will demonstrate how the above 
data can be analysed using the requirements distillation method in 
order to derive privacy requirements for the mobile Facebook 
application. 
4. PRIVACY FACETS FRAMEWORK 
The main challenge of analysing qualitative data to derive privacy 
requirements is that the requirements will have to be 
systematically extracted from things that are not relevant but are 
tightly entwined with the users’ experience, for example, the noise 
emanating from the operating context. To address this challenge, 
we propose a novel analytical framework, called Privacy Facets 
(PriF), whose objectives are to provide: (a) analytical tools such 
as thematic codes, heuristics, facet questions and extraction rules 
to structure qualitative data; and (b) information-flow problem 
patterns and privacy arguments language to model privacy 
requirements. 
4.1 Privacy-sensitive contexts  
Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing and 
reporting patterns or themes within qualitative data [10]. A 
‘theme’ is said to capture something important about the data or 
having meaning within the dataset. When themes emerge within 
the data, they are encoded using appropriate codes (or labels) in a 
                                                                
1 The mobile Facebook app has significantly changed since 2009. 
process called ‘coding’ [14] or ‘thematic coding’ [20]. Similarly, 
distillation employs coding and makes use of specialised codes 
provided by the PriF framework to structure privacy related 
segments within the qualitative data. 
Qualitative data may contain not only the users’ experience but 
also their social interactions with other mobile users and actors in 
environment that may or may not be relevant to privacy. 
Therefore, the challenge of structuring this data would relate to 
isolating those aspects that are relevant to the extraction of 
privacy requirements. For this, the PriF framework provides a set 
of user-centric heuristics called Negative Behaviour Patterns 
(NBPs) and Negative Emotional Indicators (NEIs) to identify 
situations or settings involving privacy threats. We refer to the 
segments of qualitative data identified using these heuristics as a 
privacy-sensitive context or PS-context. This notion is adaption of 
‘context’ from [16] where it is stated as ‘any information that can 
be used to characterise the situation of entities (i.e. whether a 
person, place or object) that are considered relevant to the 
interaction between a user and an application, including the user 
and the application themselves’. Therefore, PS-context refers to 
the location, identity and state of people, groups and 
computational and physical objects that affect end-users’ privacy. 
 NBPs are used to identify situations where users choose to not 
use (or ignore) an application due to privacy concerns (e.g., 
switching off all location services on their mobile device); or 
situations where the user completes a task that is supported by 
the application by some alternative means (e.g., 
communicating their location through a voice phone call 
rather than a location-based social network). This is based on 
the approach ‘waving the red flag’ and ‘looking for the 
negative case’ used by [14]. 
 NEIs are a set of key words that indicate the negative 
emotional state of the user in response to an event or action in 
the environment. For example, some of the key words are: 
concerned, unhappy, worried, scared, dislike etc. and include 
synonyms and semantically equivalent phrases. The presence 
of these NEIs in the qualitative data can indicate the presence 
of a privacy threat or concern. This is an adaptation of 
‘looking at emotions that are expressed and the situations that 
aroused them’ used by [14]. 
Considering the example data from the mobile Facebook study 
(Table I), excerpt [A.1.16] would be coded as a NBP (based on 
the phrase ‘I don’t take my phone out, I don’t do Facebook’). 
Likewise excerpt [A.3.42] which includes an indication of a 
workaround (‘I would do that in person rather than on 
Facebook’). Excerpt [A.2.25] on the other hand includes ‘I don’t 
feel so comfortable,’ indicating that is should be coded as a NEI. 
4.2 Facet questions and privacy determinants 
After extracting a PS-context from the data, the social aspects of 
the user’s interaction have to be understood, for example, the 
actors involved, their roles and relationships with the user and the 
type of interactions that take place between them. To this end, the 
PriF framework proposes the use of ‘facets’ - a notion very similar 
to that of viewpoints [19] where each facet is considered to hold 
partial domain knowledge of the system. Since the knowledge is 
very specific to privacy, the facets are called privacy facets, each 
having unique properties and functions that must be analysed and 
addressed separately while at the same time be considered 
together to ensure completeness and consistency. There are four 
privacy facets namely: Information, Information Flow, Actor and 
Place. 
Each facet can be used to gather specific domain knowledge that 
affects the privacy of mobile application users. The information 
facet elicits knowledge regarding what information is created by 
the software system, while the actor facet focuses on who the 
information is transmitted to, the information flow facet identifies 
why the information was transmitted and the place facet captures 
where the information was created or transmitted.  
In the remainder of this section we describe the questions, privacy 
determinants and threats associated with each facet. For each 
privacy determinant, we also indicate the code used to annotate 
the qualitative data (e.g., [CODE(ATTR)]). 
Information facet: Software systems produce data either by 
themselves (e.g. log transactions) or when the users interact with 
their functionality (e.g. take a digital photo). In order to be clear 
about how we relate data to information, we adopt Tenopir’s 
definition of data and information in [52] which states: data are 
facts that are the result of observation or measurement and 
information is meaningful data or data arranged or interpreted in a 
way to provide meaning. When considering the privacy of 
information, we identify four questions that can be used to elicit 
the key privacy determinants relevant to this facet – 
 Is the information personal or sensitive? - Personal 
information relates to a living individual who can be 
identified from that information. Sensitive information refers 
to information pertaining to an individual that can be used to 
characterise them in some way (e.g.  religion, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, etc.) [45]. Code: [I-TYPE(PERSONAL | 
SENSITIVE)] 
 Is the information collected automatically (by computer 
automation) or manually (input by end-users)? - These two 
modes of information creation impact the types of privacy 
threats that can be discovered in the software system. For 
example, if the software system sampled certain information at 
a high frequency it can cause a surveillance effect. Code: [I-
MODE(AUTO | MANUAL)] 
 What is the purpose of the information or its context of use? - 
Knowing for what purpose the information is being collected 
is important, as it will help in later checking if the purpose 
was fulfilled or if it was used in a way detrimental to a user’s 
privacy. Code:  [I-PURPOSE] 
 What are the information attributes? - Quality attributes can 
influence how the information is used within the system and 
perceived by its users. For example, some quality attributes 
could relate to accuracy (precision of data), completeness (all 
required data fields are filled), freshness (data is not expired 
and has become irrelavent), timeliness (data received at 
expected time frame i.e. within accepted latency), etc.  Code: 
[I-ATTR(ACCURATE | COMPLETE | FRESH | ONTIME)  
Actors facet: The actors facet pertains to the roles that a user can 
play in a given context and their relationships with other users. In 
the context of a software system, the roles of actors has a 
significant impact on the information-flows, thus understanding 
the roles of the actors (sender, subject and receiver); their 
relationships and responsibilities are critical to protecting privacy. 
For example, in a ‘Hospital’ context, the readings of patient’s 
body temperature may be required by physicians to treat a health 
problem. The roles of both the patient and the physician with their 
roles, relationship and responsibilities should be understood and 
clearly defined. Privacy violations occur when these are 
ambiguous [2]. We identify the following questions for eliciting 
the key privacy determinants relating to the actors facet –  
 What are the role relationships between the information 
sender, receiver and subject? - A role is the abstract 
characterisation of the behaviour of an active entity (or agent) 
within some context [35]. A relationship refers the relations 
between agents and corresponds to the social aspect of a role 
[28]. Together they determine the level of trust, which 
influences the sharing of sensitive information. Code: 
[ROLE(RELATIONSHIP)] 
 What are the responsibilities associated with each role? - 
Responsibility is when one agent is responsible to another 
agent for something, and that this something can be described 
as a possible mismatch or non-conformance relation between 
an actual state of affairs and a desired, expected or feasible 
state of affairs (adapted from [28], p.87-106)). 
Responsibilities can affect the power relationships between 
actors, which in turn influences the information flows in a 
given context. Code: [ROLE(RESPONSBILITY)] 
Information-flow facet: In order to understand the privacy 
requirements, all possible flows of information between the 
interacting users must be examined. Each of these information 
flows are governed by what Nissenbaum [37] calls transmission 
principles - informally established terms and conditions that guide 
the flow of information between different actors. In other words, 
transmission principles are constraints placed on the flow of 
information and breaching these constraints leads to a privacy 
violation. The following questions can be used to help elicit the 
key privacy determinants associated with this facet –  
 What goals and purposes hold for information about a subject, 
flowing between the sender and receiver? – These 
transmission principles determine the privacy expectations of 
the subject, for example, if the subject needs to consent before 
the information is sent. Code: [FLOW(SENDER-SUBJECT)] 
 What goals and purposes hold for information flows between 
the sender and receiver? – These transmission principles 
determine the privacy expectations of the sender and receiver, 
for example the sender would expect only certain receivers 
and not others. Code: [FLOW(SENDER-RECEIVER)] 
 Are there any 3rd-party recipients of the information? – This 
determines the flow of information to 3rd-parties who can 
misuse the information. Code: [FLOW(3RDPARTY)] 
Place facet: The place refers to a unique geographic location with 
a material form, meaning and value [21]. When mobile users 
move through different places, they interact with the objects that 
are present. Lessig [31] points out that the architecture at a given 
place influences privacy, in other words, the way in which the 
physical objects such as human agents and technologies are 
arranged in a place can have a direct impact on users’ privacy; this 
was also shown by user studies from Mancini et al. [33]. Places 
can have their own set of rules or norms regulating social 
behaviours and interactions within them. Users are subjected to 
these rules, which may protect the privacy of others. The 
questions to be used to elicit the privacy determinants associated 
with the place facet are as follows –  
 What are the places associated with the subject, sender and 
receiver? – Used to identify the places that can be associated 
with a privacy-sensitive context for the different actors.  
Code: [PLACE(LOCATION)] 
 What norms apply to a place? – Used to identify the expected 
behaviours associated with a given place. Deviations from the 
expected behaviour can result in privacy threats being 
realised. Code: [PLACE(NORM)] 
By asking the above questions of the example data from the 
mobile Facebook study (Table 1), we can apply the relevant codes 
for identifying the privacy concerns experienced by the user. The 
resulting coding is shown in Table 2, where for each example 
statement we have used different formatting to highlight the 
elements of the text that identify a PS-context, as well as the 
applicable privacy facets.  
For instance, in statement [A.3.42] a privacy related context 
associated with a negative behaviour pattern (NBP) is identified 
due to the user saying ‘I would do that in person rather than on 
Facebook’. Additionally, data elements relating to the information 
facet are identified in those portions of statement containing the 
text ‘private’ and ‘like a girl that I liked’, indicating that there is 
sensitive information being described in this context. 
Table 2. Structured data from Mobile Facebook study 
[A.1.16] If I am out with friends I don’t take my phone 
out, I don’t do Facebook ...yes, ok, if I am with my sister 
I keep to read emails, but no I don’t use Facebook and I 
tend not to use the mobile...because I am busy with other 
stuff, talking with them, socialising...Facebook tends to fill 
the gaps...if I am with a person I concentrate with that 
person. [NBP, PLACE(NORM)] 
[A.2.25] ...things like buses and trains I don’t feel so 
comfortable..., because I don’t know...lots of people I don’t 
know...if they for example read some of the posts I have 
done...they don’t know the people that they are aimed at or 
the back story...they’d probably come across quite 
differently and they would not understand them, it would 
look a little weird..[they would get] the wrong sort of 
almost the wrong first impression. [NEI, 
PLACE(LOCATION)] 
[A.3.42] anything I feel is private to myself I keep it to 
myself. I have a lot of good friends so if I want to share it I 
am happy to share it with all my friends. If there was 
something private, that is more close to me, like a girl that 
I liked and I wanted to share it with a friend I would do that 
in person rather than on Facebook. [NBP, I-
TYPE(SENSITIVE), ROLE(RELATIONSHIP), 
FLOW(SENDER-RECEIVER)] 
Key to coded text: Privacy-sensitive context | Information 
facet | Actor facet | Information Flow facet | Place facet 
In the next section we demonstrate how these codes can be used 
in the formulation of extraction rules for retrieving the qualitative 
data associated with different privacy threats. The data associated 
with each threat can then be used to identify gaps between the 
current software system and the users’ expectation, leading to the 
discovery of privacy requirements. 
4.3 Privacy threats and concerns 
Parameters that influence privacy within a facet are likely to 
contribute to privacy threats; these are privacy violations that are 
likely to happen. When privacy threats are analysed in 
conjunction with the existing software system, its failings can be 
captured as privacy concerns which will have to be addressed in 
in a future version of the system. The PriF framework lists the 
possible threats and concerns that can be identified from the 
qualitative data. 
As mentioned earlier, we define mobile privacy requirements as: a 
set of constraints on a mobile computing application that enables 
appropriate flow of information depending on the user’s context. 
This notion of privacy is particularly suited for mobile 
applications because it takes context into consideration. Using the 
definitions used by Nissenbaum’s Contextual Integrity framework 
[37], information-flow is described as a user (sender) transmitting 
information (or information attributes) about a subject to a user 
(receiver), while complying with a specific set of transmission 
principles.  
For simplicity, in this paper we consider examples where the 
sender and subject are the same individual, but this need not 
always be the case. In general, transmission principles refer to the 
goals and purposes that govern the flow of information, 
encompassing the means and ends for which the information is 
being transmitted. 
Madsen et al. [32] discuss several types of information flows in a 
software system that are relevant to addressing privacy, but this 
work concentrates only on those that are critical to addressing 
privacy in mobile applications which support peer-to-peer user 
interactions (e.g., mobile social networking applications). The 
majority of these applications are designed to make use of an 
intermediate application service provider(s) to facilitate 
information sharing among its users. Figure 2 shows a generic 
architecture containing three information-flows: information is 
created and sent to a service provider (F1), stored information is 
requested and is sent to a receiver (F2) and information sent to 
unintended receivers by either the service provider or the receiver 
(F3). The unintended receivers can also refer to actors who are co-
located and in close proximity to the sender or receiver and is able 
to access the information without making a request to the software 
system. 
 
Figure 2. Information flows handled by the PriF Framework 
A privacy violation is said to occur when an information-flow 
causes harm to the user, because of its faulty composition or 
because it is inappropriate. The components in an information-
flow that influence privacy are called privacy determinants (e.g., 
sensitivity of information or role of the receiver). Privacy threats 
map information-flows in a software system to the harms a user 
Table 3.   Privacy threats, associated harms and data extraction rules 
ID Privacy Threat Faulty information flows Example Harms Data Extraction Rule 
T1 Identification Subject’s personal information is 
revealed. 
Identity theft (H1) 
Financial loss (H2) 
I-TYPE(PERSONAL)  
AND [NBP OR NEI] 
T2 Exposure Personal/sensitive information received 
by unintended recipients 
Discrimination (H5) 
Loss of anonymity (H7) 
Relationship breakdown (H8) 
Embarrassment (H9) 
Physical danger (H10) 
I-TYPE(SENSTIVE)  
AND [NBP OR NEI] 
T3 Surveillance Receiver makes frequent requests for 
information about the subject. 
Emotional harm (H4) 
Loss of freedom (H6) 
Physical danger (H10) 
I-MODE(AUTO)   
AND [NBP OR NEI] 
T4 Aggregation Receiver combines datasets to produce a 
new type of information without the 
subject’s consent. 
Discrimination (H5) I-PURPOSE  
AND [NBP OR NEI] 
T5 Misinformation Inaccurate or insufficient level of 
information about the subject is 
transmitted. 
Loss of reputation (H3) 
Emotional harm (H4) 
Discrimination (H5) 
I-ATTR(*)  
AND [NBP OR NEI] 
T6 Breach of trust Receiver forwards the information to 
others contravening the subject’s terms 
and conditions. 
Loss of reputation (H3) 
Emotional harm (H4) 
 
ROLE(RELATIONSHIP)  
AND [NBP OR NEI] 
T7 Power imbalance Receiver uses information to control the 
subject. 
Loss of freedom (H6) 
Relationship breakdown (H8) 
ROLE(RESPONSIBILITY) 
AND [NBP OR NEI] 
T8 Cross-contextual 
information flow 
Information from one context may be 
used in another context 
Loss of reputation (H3) 
Discrimination (H5) 
FLOW(*) 
AND [NBP OR NEI] 
T9 Proximal access Unintended receivers can access 
information due to close physical 
proximity to the sender or receiver. 
Loss of reputation (H3) 
Loss of freedom (H6) 
Loss of anonymity (H7) 
Embarrassment (H9) 
PLACE(LOCATION) 
AND [NBP OR NEI] 
T10 Intrusion Information flow disturbs receiver’s 
tranquility. 
Emotional harm (H4) 
Loss of freedom (H6) 
PLACE(NORM) 
AND [NBP OR NEI] 
 
can suffer and privacy threats when realised cause privacy 
violations. Privacy concerns describe the gap between the 
requirements model (or its implementation) and the identified 
privacy threats. Privacy requirements address these privacy 
concerns by providing suitable feedback and control facilities 
such that the user has better control over the information-flows, 
which are linked with specific privacy threats.  
The privacy taxonomy proposed by Solove [43] has sixteen types 
of privacy violations that are broadly applicable to software 
systems, however they do not necessarily focus on privacy 
violations that are possible when using mobile applications. One 
of our previous empirical studies involving mobile users [33] 
identified privacy violations related to the use of mobile 
applications. Combining both these contributions, we refine and 
present the privacy threats applicable for mobile software systems, 
together with the potential harm associated with each threat 
(Table 3).  
This taxonomy of privacy threats and harms that we have 
developed links the privacy threats that can arise due an 
inappropriate information flow to the potential harm that can 
result to the end user. For example, a mobile application that 
allows sensitive information to flow to an unintended recipient 
will create an exposure threat (T2) that might result in 
discrimination (H5), loss of anonymity (H7), relationship 
breakdown (H8), embarrassment (H9) or physical danger (H10) to 
the end user. 
Table 3 also shows the data extraction rule associated with each 
threat, which can be used to retrieve the qualitative data that 
matches the combination of codes given in each rule.  
For instance, executing the extraction rule for the exposure threat 
(T2) will return the excerpt [A.3.42] from Table 2, which is coded 
with both I-TYPE(SENSTIVE) and NBP. This indicates that the 
mobile Facebook application causes the user to report a negative 
behaviour when sensitive data is associated with a data flow. This 
privacy threat arises because the application is unable to detect the 
information type or limit its flow to a subset of the user’s friends.  
4.4 Information-flow problem patterns 
Since privacy requirements are related to information-flows in a 
software system these must be modeled as part of the 
requirements distillation process. The PriF framework uses 
information-flow problem patterns for this purpose. The first part 
of the information-flow relates to how information is created. The 
PriF framework captures this aspect as an information creation 
problem pattern while the second aspect is captured as an 
information dissemination problem pattern, both of which are 
based on the Problem Frames method [27]. We have chosen 
Problem Frames for our analytical framework because it supports 
a notion of context where real world domains (i.e. physical 
domains) are explicitly modelled which are critical to 
understanding privacy in mobile applications.  
Information-flow in its simplest form consists of a sender, receiver 
and the information that is transmitted between them. As privacy 
relates to flow of personal/sensitive information, the subject of the 
information should also be considered. In addition, information-
flows have goals and purposes to achieve, which play an 
important role in the flow of personal information from the sender 
to the receiver [37]. 
Putting all these together we define a privacy problem in an 
information system as that of: building a machine that will allow 
appropriate flow of personal information and/or avoid 
inappropriate flow of personal information (i.e. avoid privacy 
violations); where the appropriate or inappropriate flow of 
personal information is a function of the information type, roles of 
actors and transmission principle.  
A composite model of the information-flow problem frame for the 
‘Status update’ feature of the mobile Facebook application is 
shown in Figure 3. It is composed of two smaller sub-problems: 
information creation (IC) problem and information dissemination 
(ID) problem. 
In the information creation problem, the mobile phone acts as 
connection domain between the user and the machine. In the 
problem frame diagram (Figure 3) the user is a biddable domain 
representing the human operator. To create the status message, the 
user issues a create command Create(SM) at interface a, which is 
executed by the machine, sending equivalent commands to the 
model domain status message where it is stored. The User issues 
commands Update(SM) and Delete(SM) respectively to perform 
further updates and deletions to the status messages. 
In the second part of the problem, the emphasis is on how the 
information reaches the recipients, therefore modelling of 
information dissemination deals with the viewing or receiving of 
the information. Normally, users are able to view information 
when they make queries to the software system, however the 
mobile Facebook application is designed to display a user’s status 
message to their friends as soon as the application is launched.  
Therefore, the friends of the user are able to view the status 
message when they log into the software system because the 
system automatically makes a request, the command Request(SM) 
at interface g and the message answering machine responds to the 
query by reading the information from the model domain Status 
Message at interface e and updates the mobile display 
accordingly. 
 
Figure 3. Information flow problem frame for ‘status update’ 
With the basic information flows of the ‘Update Status’ feature 
modelled, we can now analyse the control variant of this 
information-flow model where the emphasis is on the controlling 
of information and the rules that govern its dissemination. 
Therefore, in the control variant problem frame (Figure 4) the 
central feature is a privacy rules model domain, which contains 
rules for information creation and editing; and also rules for 
answering queries for information.  
 Figure 4. Control variant problem frame for 'status update' 
The message creating controller checks the privacy rules to 
determine if the user is allowed to issue the commands to create, 
modify, delete or forward status messages. Similarly, when the 
friends make request for the status message, the message 
answering controller checks the privacy rules to determine if the 
request should be answered or not, setting the mobile screen 
display accordingly. 
While the above problem frames modelled the information-flow 
within the software system, its control variants help in 
constraining how the information is created and disseminated, 
thus addressing privacy. Out of the five basic problem frames 
found in the Problem Frames method [27], the information 
creation problem is a modification of the basic workpiece problem 
frame while the information dissemination is fitted to an operator 
variant of an information problem frame. In the problem frames 
method, each problem has a frame concern, which highlights a 
certain aspect of the problem demanding the attention of the 
analyst/developer.  
Similarly, in the PriF framework the privacy concern is simply a 
special type of frame concern relating to privacy, which the 
analyst must take into account and address in the software system 
to make it privacy-aware. Therefore, the privacy concerns 
extracted from the qualitative data through the use of facets 
should be addressed in order to support the privacy of end users. 
4.5 Privacy Arguments 
In previous work we developed a notation for mobile application 
privacy requirements called privacy arguments, that could: be 
used to reason about privacy requirements; be integrated into a 
mobile application to enable users to fine-tune the requirements at 
run-time; and provide run-time diagnostics about the satisfaction 
of privacy requirements [48]. However, there was no process to 
support the formulation of privacy argument classes. We have 
integrated privacy arguments into the PriF framework, extending 
it to link the requirements derived through the distillation process 
to the original qualitative data. 
From a developer’s perspective, a privacy argument justifies to an 
audience, such as users of mobile applications, that the user’s 
privacy claim has been respected by the software system. The 
general structure of privacy arguments is: (Warrant, Ground → 
Claim). Privacy requirements described as the claim of an 
argument that needs to be justified. The ground is the collection of 
facts that can be observed from the world domains, which 
supports the claim. The warrant is the collection of domain-
specific rules that links the ground to the claim of the argument. 
The developer can formulate privacy arguments as argument 
classes, which are instantiated by the user with specific parameter 
values that are appropriate to their particular context.  
5. CASE STUDY:  MOBILE FACEBOOK  
In section 4.3 we explained how the qualitative data was used to 
highlight a privacy concern relating to the threat of sensitive data 
being exposed. This concern arose because the software system is 
unable to distinguish between sensitive and non-sensitive 
information, resulting in sensitive information being visible to all 
friends. Using the PS-context that was extracted to derive this 
concern [A.3.42] we can express this as shown in Listing 1. 
Here the argument class MFb_CloseFriends_Norm captures the 
user’s intended behaviour as described by the qualitative data, 
whereas the argument MFb_Exposure_Concern specifies the 
behaviour of the system that causes the user to exhibit a negative 
behaviour pattern. To address this concern, we could build a 
machine that would automatically check if the information is 
sensitive or not, otherwise the machine could prompt to the user 
to make the decision.  
By being able to determine information sensitivity, the software 
system will be able to ensure that sensitive information is not 
visible to any unintended recipients (e.g., in this case, if the user 
selects a group of friends/recipients who should not be viewing 
the sensitive information, then the software system can 
immediately alert the user of the potential threat). In this way, we 
can mitigate the effect of exposure where sensitive information 
cannot be leaked to a wider unintended audience. 
Listing 1. Privacy norm and exposure concern argument 
In order to mitigate the exposure concern, the requirement for 
checking of information sensitivity is captured in the following 
argument construct (Listing 2). 
argument: MFb_CloseFriends_Norm 
PN1 "<<User>> can only share Status Messages 
with close friends" { 
  supported by  
    F1 "<<User>> has close friends" 
    F2 "<<User>> creates sensitive msg" 
    F3 "<<User>> wants sensitive msg to be  
         seen by close friends only" 
    F4 "Close friends want to see sensitive msg" 
  warranted by 
    R1 "<<User>> inputs sensitive msg" 
    R2 "When a close-friend taps the Fb icon  
        on his mobile device, the application  
        opens with sensitive msg displayed”} 
 
argument: MFb_Exposure_Concern  
PC2 “Status messages are considered as non- 
     sensitive by the system” rebuts PN1 { 
  supported by 
    F6 “User is unable to classify a status  
        message as being sensitive or non-  
        sensitive” 
    F7 “The system is unable to differentiate  
        between sensitive and non-sensitive  
        status message”} 
 Listing 2. Privacy argument to check information sensitivity 
Detecting the creation of information sensitivity is just one part, 
the other part relates to information receivers. From the problem 
context [A.3.42], it is evident that the user wished to share 
sensitive status messages only with close friends but the software 
system did not facilitate the creation of such groups. Therefore, 
the next privacy requirement is about allowing the user to create a 
recipient group called ‘close friends’ (Listing 3). 
 
Listing 3. Privacy argument to create ‘close friend’ group 
On its own, the privacy requirements PR1 and PR2 may not be 
sufficient to mitigate privacy concern PC2 because it does not 
take into consideration the recipients who will receive the 
sensitive information. Another requirement regarding query 
answering must be defined such that only those who are members 
of the close-friends group may be allowed to see status messages 
marked as being sensitive. This is done by an additional 
requirement in PR3 as shown in Listing 4. 
 
Listing 4. Privacy argument for information dissemination 
We use the depends on clause to indicate that PR3 has a 
dependency on other requirements such as PR1 - the system’s 
ability to determine if the status message was sensitive or not and 
PR2 – the user’s ability to create a group (list) of close friends. As 
shown, a privacy requirement can mitigate one or more privacy 
concerns and similarly a privacy concern can rebut one or more 
information-flow norms in a software system. This third phase of 
distillation showed the derivation of privacy requirements for 
mobile applications, in the form of privacy arguments, for a single 
privacy concern associated with the threat of exposure (T2). A 
similar analysis process can be carried out to yield requirements 
relating to other concerns derived from the qualitative data. 
6. DISCUSSION 
Distillation not only follows a systematic approach but also its 
output in the form of privacy arguments can be traced back to its 
source in the qualitative data. Further, the information-flow 
problem models with their associated privacy arguments aimed to 
address the gaps in the software system studied and therefore 
protect the privacy of end-users. However, in this section we 
discuss some of the factors that influence the validity and 
limitations of our approach.  
The first limitation of our approach is scalability. Distillation uses 
a number of different analysis techniques. For example in order to 
apply privacy requirements distillation, software engineers need to 
be familiar with qualitative data analysis techniques, which is not 
the norm. Whilst acquiring the necessary data coding skills is not 
difficult, it takes practice to get it right with the analysts’ level of 
expertise influencing the quality of output. This can be managed 
through the use of software tools and templates, which can reduce 
the complexity and improve the outcome of the analysis. One way 
to encourage the use of distillation would be to provide software 
tools to assist the analyst. In the next section we describe some of 
the tooling options we have explored in order to support the 
distillation process. 
The second factor relates to reliability. Similar to other inductive 
approaches, thematic coding in the distillation approach is 
subjective and depends on the software engineer's interpretation 
of raw data. This implies that identification of PS-contexts, 
privacy threats and concerns can be biased. Inductive approaches 
prescribe the use of an assessment process where an initial coder 
produces a set of codes and additional analysts may be asked to 
apply these codes to the same raw data. The variations between 
the initial coder and subsequent ones are statistically measured to 
prove the reliability of codes [18][46], a similar assessment needs 
to be carried out on distillation, Although, it may not be difficult 
to train a group of software engineers to use our approach, to 
overcome any initial inter-coder disagreements, software 
engineers can be encouraged to discuss and agree with each 
other's interpretations of the raw data, similar to code cross-
checking [20]. While we acknowledge such inter-coder 
assessments can improve the confidence and reliability of our 
approach, this is considered to be future work. 
The third factor relates to distillation’s generalisability. The 
qualitative data from the mobile Facebook study had two 
dimensions, namely (a) mobility of users (b) personal privacy. 
Although distillation and more specifically the PriF framework 
had been designed to analyse these two dimensions, we believe 
the approach can cover scenarios where the dimension of mobility 
is not included in the input, for example, qualitative data from 
studies involving Facebook users with no reference to their 
mobility. In such cases, the place facet in the PriF framework may 
not be fully utilised. But for the approach to be successful the 
underlying privacy norms that produce negative behaviour 
patterns (NBPs) and emotions (NEIs) in users should be captured 
in the qualitative data. This leads us to conclude that distillation 
critically relies on NEIs and NPBs within the qualitative data to 
analyse privacy requirements and without these markers it will be 
difficult to apply this approach on other datasets. Therefore, 
distillation cannot be generalised for qualitative data that does not 
have a strong focus on privacy. 
The last factor relates to completeness. The application of 
distillation demonstrated how the approach can help software 
engineers derive privacy requirements that address end-users' 
argument: MFb_Close_Friends_Group 
PR2 "<<User>> can create group of close  
    friends" mitigates PC2{ 
  supported by F1 
  warranted by 
    Cr3 "<<User>> issues command:”  
         CreateGroup(CloseFriends)” 
    Fr2 "<<User>> assigns friends to group”: 
         AssignGroupMember(f, CloseFriends) } 
argument: MFb_Close_Friends_Viewing 
PR3 "Only close friends of <<User>> can see  
     sensitive status messages"  
  mitigates PC2{ 
  depends on PR1, PR2 
  warranted by 
    Cr5 "Senstive status msg only visible to      
         close friends”: 
         IF SensitiveMessage(m)&  
     CloseFriends(cf,User) THEN 
     StatusMessageView(m,cf)} 
argument: MFb_Inf_Sensitivity_Detect 
PR1 "Status message sensitivity can be  
    detected" mitigates PC2{ 
  supported by F2 
  warranted by 
    Cr1 "System detects sensitivity of msg:" 
        ? SensitiveMessage(StatusMsg) 
    Fr2 "If Cr1 is indeterminate, ask user to  
        select sensitivity label”} 
privacy concerns. While the derived requirements could be used 
to improve the design of privacy functionality of the software 
system that was studied, it was not possible to validate this by 
modifying the software and testing it with the users again. Using 
distillation in an iterative software development project, where the 
effectiveness of the derived requirements can be evaluated 
empirically remains an area for future work. 
7. TOOL SUPPORT 
There were two main requirements for automated tool support of 
our privacy requirements distillation process. First, it should 
support the extraction of privacy concerns from qualitative data, 
and second, it should support the modelling of information flows 
of the current software system and later help in the privacy 
problem analysis. Both of these activities are based on two well-
known and proven methods: qualitative data analysis and the 
problem frames method respectively. As a first step towards 
supporting software engineers in distilling privacy requirements 
we decided to customise existing tools from each of these areas. 
 
Figure 5. NVivo codes for PriF framework 
From the qualitative data analysis domain, we chose to use Nvivo 
(http://bit.ly/NVivo) because of its prevalence and wide use in 
qualitative research. One of the main advantages of using  NVivo 
is that the codes from the PriF framework can be pre-defined and 
stored to be re-used by other projects/analysts. The pre-defined 
codes in NVivo serve as a template for the structuring of 
qualitative data, making it easier for the analyst to readily apply 
the codes on the transcribed texts. In NVivo, each node represents 
a code or concept. Therefore, all the codes used in coding phase 
of distillation - NEIs, NBPs and privacy facets (Section IV) are 
defined as a hierarchy of nodes in Nvivo (Figure 5). The tool also 
supports the specification of extraction rules, thus automating 
identification of the privacy-related contexts associated with 
different threats. 
For privacy problem analysis, we chose to use OpenArgue [51], 
an Eclipse plug-in that supports both problem frames modelling 
and incremental arguments written in propositional logic. The tool 
can perform syntax checking, visualizing, formalizing, and 
reasoning over these incremental arguments. OpenArgue 
integrates a ‘decreasoner’, which is an off-the-shelf reasoning tool 
that translates propositional formulae into problems for SAT-
solvers. The integrated tool supports logical deduction to check 
whether an argument is valid, and model finding to obtain 
counterexamples to the argument. On the basis of these results, 
rebuttals and mitigations are generated and visualized.  
While the use of the off-the-shelf tools was adequate to testing the 
concepts behind the privacy requirements distillation method, the 
lack of integration between the tools was a drawback. 
Additionally, to be useful in real-world mobile applications 
development projects it will be necessary to develop tools that 
integrate directly into standard development environments such as 
Eclipse. Since the source code for OpenArgue is freely available, 
and it is already integrated into Eclipse, our strategy is to extend 
this tool to support the qualitative data analysis needs of the 
requirements distillation approach. Development of this tool 
remains an area of future work. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
Eliciting mobile privacy requirements is challenging, largely due 
to the fact that mobile privacy issues are so dependent on the 
physical and socio-cultural context of the users. This means that 
only data that captures the nuances of these contextual factors and 
variations can adequately inform the development of privacy 
requirements for privacy-aware mobile applications. The 
distillation approach we proposed in this paper allows 
requirements analysts to take advantage of the richness of 
qualitative empirical data while refining this data systematically 
into a form that enables it to be used for the design of mobile 
applications that reflect users’ real privacy concerns and needs. 
Our distillation process uses a novel privacy facets framework to 
structure raw data and to derive privacy concerns. 
To support the privacy distillation we have adapted off-the-shelf 
tools such as NVivo and OpenArgue. Further automated tools can 
help the software engineer integrate different phases of the 
distillation process into standard software development 
environments such as Eclipse. In addition to undertaking work to 
address the limitations discussed above, we intend to conduct 
further evaluations of our approach by using other sources of 
empirical data, such as our studies of location tracking [34]. 
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